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Test DNS, SSL/TLS, HTTP and HTML

Test results for robotattack.org

Scanned on: Wed Jul 25 12:03:10 2018 GMT. Tested in 71 seconds

DNS Report

DNSSEC                 not offered
Zone transfer (AXFR)   not allowed (OK)
CAA Record             offered (OK)
SPF Record             offered (OK)
DMARC Record           not offered
MTA-STS                not offered
TLSRPT Record          not offered

Raw DNS Records

Name TTL Type Data
robotattack.org 3600 SOA ns1.schokokeks-dns.de hostmaster @ schokokeks.org 2018072400 36000 3600 1209600 3600
robotattack.org 3600 NS ns1.schokokeks-dns.de, IPv4: 178.63.68.96, IPv6: 2a01:4f8:121:1ffe:1:0:0:2
robotattack.org 3600 NS ns2.schokokeks-dns.de, IPv4: 94.130.248.104, IPv6: 2a01:4f8:13b:1907:1:0:0:2
robotattack.org 3600 NS ns3.schokokeks-dns.de, IPv4: 37.120.167.100
robotattack.org 3600 A 178.63.68.96
robotattack.org 3600 AAAA 2a01:4f8:121:1ffe:1:1749:0:1467
robotattack.org 3600 CAA 0 issue letsencrypt.org
robotattack.org 3600 MX 100 zucker.schokokeks.org
robotattack.org 3600 TXT v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.schokokeks-dns.de -all
www.robotattack.org 3600 A 178.63.68.96
www.robotattack.org 3600 AAAA 2a01:4f8:121:1ffe:1:1749:0:1467

SSL/TLS Report

 Further IP addresses:   2a01:4f8:121:1ffe:1:1749:0:1467 
 A record via            supplied IP "178.63.68.96"
 rDNS (178.63.68.96):    zucker.schokokeks.org.
 Service detected:       HTTP


 SSL/TLS protocols 
 SSLv2      not offered (OK)
 SSLv3      not offered (OK)
 TLS 1      offered
 TLS 1.1    offered
 TLS 1.2    offered (OK)
 TLS 1.3    not offered -- downgraded
 NPN/SPDY   not offered
 ALPN/HTTP2 h2, http/1.1 (offered)

 SSL/TLS server implementation bugs 

 No bugs found.

 Cipher categories 

 NULL ciphers (no encryption)                  not offered (OK) -- NULL:eNULL
 Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication)    not offered (OK) -- aNULL:ADH
 Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL)                 not offered (OK) -- EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL
 LOW: 64 Bit + DES encryption (w/o export)     not offered (OK) -- LOW:DES:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL
 Weak 128 Bit ciphers (SEED, IDEA, RC[2,4])    not offered (OK) -- MEDIUM:!aNULL:!AES:!CAMELLIA:!ARIA:!CHACHA20:!3DES
 Triple DES Ciphers (Medium)                   not offered (OK) -- 3DES:!aNULL:!ADH
 High encryption (AES+Camellia, no AEAD)       offered (OK) -- HIGH:!NULL:!aNULL:!DES:!3DES:!AESGCM:!CHACHA20:!AESGCM:!CamelliaGCM:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM
 Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers)              offered (OK) -- AESGCM:CHACHA20:AESGCM:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM8:AESCCM


 Robust (perfect) forward secrecy, (P)FS -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4 

 PFS is offered (OK)          ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 
                              ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 
                              DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 
                              DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 
                              ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
                              DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 
                              DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
 Elliptic curves offered:     prime256v1 secp384r1 


 Server preferences 

 Has server cipher order?     yes (OK)
 Negotiated protocol          TLSv1.2
 Negotiated cipher            ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Cipher order
    TLSv1:     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
               DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
    TLSv1.1:   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
               DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
    TLSv1.2:   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 
               ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 
               ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 
               DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 
               ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 


 Server defaults (Server Hello) 

 TLS extensions (standard)    "server name/#0" "renegotiation info/#65281"
                              "EC point formats/#11" "session ticket/#35"
                              "status request/#5"
                              "application layer protocol negotiation/#16"
 Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint 300 seconds, session tickets keys seems to be rotated < daily
 SSL Session ID support       yes
 Session Resumption           Tickets: yes, ID: yes
 TLS clock skew               Random values, no fingerprinting possible 
 Signature Algorithm          SHA256 with RSA
 Server key size              RSA 2048 bits
 Server key usage             Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
 Server extended key usage    TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
 Serial / Fingerprints        03BBF4A21B3F904DC73A094573640A63ABB9 / SHA1 042FC02E17DB2758930E5FA077D1C1646BB93632
                              SHA256 CE829B48DE4D16099E02A86CC5CA6E86767C00E0D208B571F1E2B5AE3EF649A6
 Common Name (CN)             www.robotattack.org (CN in response to request w/o SNI: zucker.schokokeks.org)
 subjectAltName (SAN)         robotattack.org www.robotattack.org 
 Issuer                       Let's Encrypt Authority X3 (Let's Encrypt from US)
 Trust (hostname)             Ok via SAN (SNI mandatory)
 Chain of trust               Ok   
 EV cert (experimental)       no 
 Certificate Validity (UTC)   86 >= 30 days (2018-07-21 23:02 --> 2018-10-19 23:02)
 # of certificates provided   2
 Certificate Revocation List  --
 OCSP URI                     http://ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org
 OCSP stapling                offered
 OCSP must staple extension   --
 DNS CAA RR (experimental)    available - please check for match with "Issuer" above: issue=letsencrypt.org
 Certificate Transparency     yes (certificate extension)


 HTTP header response @ "/" 

 HTTP Status Code             200 OK
 HTTP clock skew              +1 sec from localtime
 Strict Transport Security    730 days=63072000 s, includeSubDomains, preload
 Public Key Pinning           --
 Server banner                Apache
 Application banner           --
 Cookie(s)                    (none issued at "/")
 Security headers             X-XSS-Protection 1; mode=block
                              X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
                              Content-Security-Policy block-all-mixed-content;default-src 'self'
                              https://robotattack.org;
                              Upgrade h2
 Reverse Proxy banner         --


 SSL/TLS vulnerabilities 

 Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)                not vulnerable (OK), no heartbeat extension
 CCS (CVE-2014-0224)                       not vulnerable (OK)
 Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244), experiment.  not vulnerable (OK)
 ROBOT                                     Server does not support any cipher suites that use RSA key transport
 Secure Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555)      not vulnerable (OK)
 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     not vulnerable (OK)
 CRIME, TLS (CVE-2012-4929)                not vulnerable (OK)
 BREACH (CVE-2013-3587)                    potentially NOT ok, uses gzip HTTP compression. - only supplied "/" tested
                                           Can be ignored for static pages or if no secrets in the page
 POODLE, SSL (CVE-2014-3566)               not vulnerable (OK)
 TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV (RFC 7507)              Downgrade attack prevention supported (OK)
 SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183, CVE-2016-6329)    not vulnerable (OK)
 FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)                     not vulnerable (OK)
 DROWN (CVE-2016-0800, CVE-2016-0703)      not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)
                                           make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services
                                           https://censys.io/ipv4?q=CE829B48DE4D16099E02A86CC5CA6E86767C00E0D208B571F1E2B5AE3EF649A6
                                           could help you to find out
 LOGJAM (CVE-2015-4000), experimental      Common prime with 2048 bits detected: 
                                           RFC3526/Oakley Group 14,
                                           but no DH EXPORT ciphers
 BEAST (CVE-2011-3389)                     TLS1: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
                                                 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
                                                 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
                                                 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA 
                                           VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols  TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2 (likely mitigated)
 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS. Check patches
 RC4 (CVE-2013-2566, CVE-2015-2808)        no RC4 ciphers detected (OK)


 Tested 364 ciphers, ordered by encryption strength 

Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 384   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384              
 xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384              
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                 
 x9f     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                
 x6b     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256                
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                   
 xc02f   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256       ECDH 384   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256              
 xc027   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256           ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256              
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                 
 x9e     DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256         DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                
 x67     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256                
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                   


 Ciphers per protocol, ordered by encryption strength 

Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TLS 1.3  
TLS 1.2  
 xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 384   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384              
 xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384              
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                 
 x9f     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384                
 x6b     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256                
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                   
 xc02f   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256       ECDH 384   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256              
 xc027   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256           ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256              
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                 
 x9e     DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256         DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                
 x67     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256                
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                   
TLS 1.1  
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                 
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                   
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                 
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                   
TLS 1  
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                 
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                   
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 384   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                 
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                   
SSLv3  
SSLv2  

 Client simulations 

 Android 4.2.2                TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Android 4.4.2                TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Android 5.0.0                TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Android 6.0                  TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Android 7.0                  TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Chrome 57 Win 7              TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Chrome 65 Win 7              TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Firefox 53 Win 7             TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Firefox 59 Win 7             TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 IE 6 XP                      No connection
 IE 7 Vista                   TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 IE 8 Win 7                   TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 IE 8 XP                      No connection
 IE 11 Win 7                  TLSv1.2 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 2048 bit DH
 IE 11 Win 8.1                TLSv1.2 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 2048 bit DH
 IE 11 Win Phone 8.1          TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 IE 11 Win 10                 TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Edge 13 Win 10               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Edge 13 Win Phone 10         TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Edge 15 Win 10               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Opera 17 Win 7               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Safari 9 iOS 9               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Safari 9 OS X 10.11          TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Safari 10 OS X 10.12         TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Apple ATS 9 iOS 9            TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Tor 17.0.9 Win 7             TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Java 6u45                    No connection
 Java 7u25                    TLSv1.0 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Java 8u161                   TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 Java 9.0.4                   TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 OpenSSL 1.0.1l               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)
 OpenSSL 1.0.2e               TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, 384 bit ECDH (P-384)


Security HTTP Headers

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)   offered (OK)
Content Security Policy (CSP)           offered (OK)
X-Frame-Options                         not offered (NOT ok)
X-XSS-Protection                        offered (OK)
X-Content-Type-Options                  offered (OK)
Expect-CT                               not offered
Referrer Policy                         not offered
Feature Policy                          not offered
Web Server Version Disclosure           not offered (OK)
Web Application Disclosure              not offered (OK)
HTTP Public Key Pins (HPKP)             not offered, deprecated

Connection Performance
Keep Alive Connection                   offered (OK)
Content Encoding (Compression)          offered (Gzip) OK, for static pages or if no secrets in the page

Raw HTTP Headers

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Accept-Ranges bytes
Connection Upgrade, Keep-Alive
Content-Encoding gzip
Content-Length 10062
Content-Security-Policy block-all-mixed-content;default-src 'self' https://robotattack.org;
Content-Type text/html; charset=UTF-8
Date Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:02:07 GMT
ETag "6655-565f97c09c370-gzip"
Keep-Alive timeout=5, max=100
Last-Modified Sat, 24 Feb 2018 18:31:25 GMT
Server Apache
Strict-Transport-Security max-age=63072000;includeSubDomains;preload
Upgrade h2
Vary Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
X-XSS-Protection 1; mode=block

Cleaned HTML

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<meta name="description" content="Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat - ROBOT is the return of a 19-year-old vulnerability that allows performing RSA decryption and signing operations with the private key of a TLS server." />
<meta name="twitter:image" content="https://robotattack.org/robot-tw.png" />
<meta property="og:url" content="https://robotattack.org/" />
<meta property="og:title" content="The ROBOT Attack" />
<meta property="og:description" content="Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat - ROBOT is the return of a 19-year-old vulnerability that allows performing RSA decryption and signing operations with the private key of a TLS server." />
<meta property="og:image" content="https://robotattack.org/robot-og.png" />
<meta property="og:image:width" content="800" />
<meta property="og:image:height" content="1200" />
<meta property="og:type" content="website" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="favicon.png" />
<title>The ROBOT Attack - Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat</title>
<link href="robot.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
<link href="fontlocal.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
</head>
<body>
<img src="robot.svg" class="tlogo" height="300" alt="ROBOT" />
<header id="top">
<h1>The ROBOT Attack</h1>
</header>
<section id="intro">
<ul class="toc">
<li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1189">Paper</a></li>
<li><a href="https://ctf.robotattack.org/">Play CTF</a></li>
</ul>
</section>
<section><a id="check"></a>
<form action="/check/" method="get"><input type="text" name="h" /> <input type="submit" value="Test Server" /></form>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat</h2>
<p><a href="https://hboeck.de/">Hanno Böck</a>, <a href="https://www.nds.rub.de/chair/people/jsomorovsky/">Juraj Somorovsky</a> (<a href="https://www.hackmanit.de/">Hackmanit GmbH</a>, Ruhr-Universität Bochum), <a href="https://secur3.us/">Craig Young</a> (<a href="https://www.tripwire.com/vert/">Tripwire VERT</a>)</p>
<p><em>Full paper <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1189">published at the Cryptology ePrint Archive</a></em></p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>The Vulnerability</h2>
<p>ROBOT is the return of a 19-year-old vulnerability that allows performing RSA decryption and signing operations with the private key of a TLS server.</p>
<p>In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher discovered that the error messages given by SSL servers for errors in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding allowed an adaptive-chosen ciphertext attack; this attack fully breaks the confidentiality of TLS when used with RSA encryption.</p>
<p>We discovered that by using some slight variations this vulnerability can still be used against many HTTPS hosts in today's Internet.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>How bad is it?</h2>
<p>For hosts that are vulnerable and only support RSA encryption key exchanges it's pretty bad. It means an attacker can passively record traffic and later decrypt it.</p>
<p>For hosts that usually use forward secrecy, but still support a vulnerable RSA encryption key exchange the risk depends on how fast an attacker is able to perform the attack. We believe that a server impersonation or man in the middle attack is possible, but it is more challenging.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Who is affected?</h2>
<p>We have identifed vulnerable implementations from at least seven vendors including F5, Citrix, and Cisco. (<a href="#patches">Current patch status is listed below.</a>)</p>
<p>Some of the most popular webpages on the Internet were affected, including Facebook and Paypal. In total, we found vulnerable subdomains on 27 of the top 100 domains as ranked by Alexa.</p>
<p>You can use the <a href="#check">test above to test public HTTPS servers</a>. We also published a <a href="https://github.com/robotattackorg/robot-detect">python tool to scan for vulnerable hosts</a>.</p>
<p>Several vendors have fixes pending and will not be named at this time. The following table will be kept up to date as patches become available.</p>
<a id="patches"></a>
<table class="table table-condensed">
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td><a href="https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K21905460">BIG-IP SSL vulnerability</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6168">CVE-2017-6168</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrix</td>
<td><a href="https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX230238">TLS Padding Oracle Vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17382">CVE-2017-17382</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radware</td>
<td><a href="https://portals.radware.com/getattachment/21be0b7b-fa1c-4cbc-8bd2-c19946aee270/Security-Advisory-Adaptive-chosen-ciphertext-atta/">Security Advisory: Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack vulnerability</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17427">CVE-2017-17427</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisco ACE</td>
<td><a href="https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20171212-bleichenbacher">Bleichenbacher Attack on TLS Affecting Cisco Products</a>, <a href="https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/interfaces-modules/services-modules/eol_C51-728979.html">End-of-Sale and End-of-Life</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17428">CVE-2017-17428</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisco ASA</td>
<td><a href="https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20171212-bleichenbacher">Bleichenbacher Attack on TLS Affecting Cisco Products</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12373">CVE-2017-12373</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouncy Castle</td>
<td>Fix in <a href="https://downloads.bouncycastle.org/betas/">1.59 beta 9</a>, <a href="https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/a00b684465b38d722ca9a3543b8af8568e6bad5c">Patch / Commit</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13098">CVE-2017-13098</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erlang</td>
<td><a href="http://erlang.org/pipermail/erlang-questions/2017-November/094257.html">OTP 18.3.4.7</a>, <a href="http://erlang.org/pipermail/erlang-questions/2017-November/094256.html">OTP 19.3.6.4</a>, <a href="http://erlang.org/pipermail/erlang-questions/2017-November/094255.html">OTP 20.1.7</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WolfSSL</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/1229">Github PR / patch</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13099">CVE-2017-13099</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palo Alto Networks</td>
<td><a href="https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/PAN-OS-exposure-to-ROBOT-attack/ta-p/192397">PAN-OS exposure to ROBOT attack</a>, <a href="https://securityadvisories.paloaltonetworks.com/Home/Detail/117">Advisory (fixed in PAN-OS 7.1.15, 8.0.7)</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17841">CVE-2017-17841</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM Domino</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/drwetter/status/943785632672907264">Twitter source (Dirk Wetter)</a> (unfixed)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM WebSphere MQ</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ibm.com/blogs/psirt/ibm-security-bulletin-websphere-mq-is-vulnerable-to-disclosing-side-channel-information-via-discrepencies-between-valid-and-invalid-pkcs1-padding-robot-cve-2018-1388/">IBM Security Bulletin</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1388">CVE-2018-1388</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MatrixSSL</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/matrixssl/matrixssl/blob/master/doc/CHANGES.md#changes-in-383">Changes in 3.8.3</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6883">CVE-2016-6883</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java / JSSE</td>
<td><a href="https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpuoct2012-1515893.html">Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - October 2012</a></td>
<td><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5081">CVE-2012-5081</a></td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>MatrixSSL and JSSE are old vulnerabilities, but we added them as we still see vulnerable hosts.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>I am affected, what shall I do?</h2>
<p>If you use one of the products that provides a fix you should of course install the update. However, we recommend something else:</p>
<h3>Disable RSA encryption!</h3>
<p>ROBOT only affects TLS cipher modes that use RSA encryption. Most modern TLS connections use an Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman key exchange and need RSA only for signatures. We believe RSA encryption modes are so risky that the only safe course of action is to disable them. Apart from being risky these modes also lack forward secrecy.</p>
<p>By disabling RSA encryption we mean all ciphers that start with TLS_RSA. It does not include the ciphers that use RSA signatures and include DHE or ECDHE in their name. These ciphers are not affected by our attack.</p>
<p>Based on some preliminary data we also believe the compatibility costs of disabling RSA encryption modes are relatively low. Cloudflare shared with us that around one percent of their connections use the RSA encryption modes. Disabling these modes on the HTTPS server operated by one of the authors caused no notable problems.</p>
<h3>I have a Cisco ACE device.</h3>
<p>Cisco informed us that the ACE product line was discontinued several years ago and that they won't provide an update. Still, we found plenty of vulnerable hosts that use these devices.</p>
<p>These devices don't support any other cipher suites, therefore disabling RSA is not an option. To our knowledge it is not possible to use these devices for TLS connections in a secure way.</p>
<p>However, if you use these products you're in good company: As far as we can tell Cisco is using them to serve the cisco.com domain.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>My server is vulnerable. Do I need to revoke my certificate?</h2>
<p><b>No.</b> This attack does not recover the server's private key. It does only allow an attacker to decrypt ciphertexts or sign messages with the server's private key.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Do I need to update my browser?</h2>
<p>No. This is an implementation bug in servers, there is nothing clients can do to prevent it.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Can you actually prove that Facebook was vulnerable?</h2>
<p>We were able to sign a test message with Facebook's private key.</p>
<p>You don't have to take our word for it; we have cryptographic proof. Just use these commands:</p>
<p><code>echo 799e4353 5a4da709 80fada33 d0fbf51a e60d32c1 115c87ab 29b716b4 9ab06377 33f92fc9 85f280fa 569e41e2 847b09e8 d028c0c2 a42ce5be eb640c10 1d5cf486 cdffc5be 116a2d5b a36e52f4 195498a7 8427982d 50bb7d9d 938ab905 40756535 8b1637d4 6fbb60a9 f4f093fe 58dbd251 2cca70ce 842e74da 078550d8 4e6abc83 ef2d7e72 ec79d7cb 2014e7bd 8debbd1e 313188b6 3a2a6aec 55de6f56 ad49d32a 1201f180 82afe3b4 edf02ad2 a1bce2f5 7104f387 f3b8401c 5a7a8336 c80525b0 b83ec965 89c36768 5205623d 2dcdbe14 66701dff c6e768fb 8af1afdb e0a1a626 54f3fd08 175069b7 b198c471 95b63083 9c663321 dc5ca39a bfb45216 db7ef837 | xxd -r -p &gt; sig<br />
curl https://crt.sh/?d=F709E83727385F514321D9B2A64E26B1A195751BBCAB16BE2F2F34EBB084F6A9|openssl x509 -noout -pubkey &gt; pubkey.key<br />
openssl rsautl -verify -pubin -inkey pubkey.key -in sig</code></p>
<p>The first line will write the signature to a file using xxd (a tool that's part of vim). The second line will download Facebook's certificate as used at the time of the attack (we could also download it from Facebook, but then it won't work after they change it). The third line will verify it and tell you that it's a signature over the text:</p>
<p><code>We hacked Facebook with a Bleichenbacher Oracle (JS/HB).</code></p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>How is it possible that a 19-year-old vulnerability is still present?</h2>
<p>After Bleichenbacher's original attack the designers of TLS decided that the best course of action was to keep the vulnerable encryption modes and add countermeasures. Later research showed that these countermeasures were incomplete leading the TLS designers to add more complicated countermeasures.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1">section on Bleichenbacher countermeasures in the latest TLS 1.2 standard (7.4.7.1)</a> is incredibly complex. It is not surprising that these workarounds aren't implemented correctly.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>If the test says I'm not vulnerable then everything is fine, right?</h2>
<p>Not necessarily.</p>
<h3>Further protocol flows and cipher suites</h3>
<p>We discovered that with slight modifications, e.g. by changing the message flow or by using different cipher modes, we could find more vulnerable hosts. It is likely that further variations may reveal new oracles.</p>
<h3>Cross-protocol and cross-server attacks</h3>
<p>Even if your server is not directly vulnerable, the attack can be applied in two cases. First, your secure server can share the same public with a vulnerable server. As shown in <a href="https://drownattack.com/">DROWN</a>, this is quite common that web servers share the same key. The attacker can then use the vulnerable server as an oracle to decrypt the confidential communication with your secure server.</p>
<p>Second, another vulnerable server can use a certificate with a domain name that matches your secure server. This would allow an attacker to perform impersonation attacks. We have actually observed such an example in the wild. The main WhatsApp web page www.whatsapp.com was not vulnerable, but we detected several vulnerable servers with a wildcart certificate issued to *.whatsapp.com.</p>
<h3>Timing attacks</h3>
<p>It is also important to note that our test does not consider timing variants of Bleichenbacher's vulnerability. However these tend to be very hard to exploit in practice.</p>
<p>You can find some info about potential timing issues in <a href="https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-dev/2017-December/009887.html">OpenSSL here</a> and in <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=577498">NSS here</a>.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>What's this PKCS #1 v1.5 you're talking about?</h2>
<p>The RSA algorithm cannot be used in its "pure" form. In order to be secure, messages need some kind of padding. PKCS #1 v1.5 is a widely used padding mode for RSA for both encryption and signatures.</p>
<p>There are more secure padding modes for RSA (PSS/OAEP), but they never gained widespread adoption. They're standardized in <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017">PKCS #1 v2.2</a>.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>What about PKCS #1 v1.5 signatures?</h2>
<p>They're also problematic, but for <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg00999.html">different</a> <a href="http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/berserk.html">reasons</a> that were not part of our research.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Is this only a problem for TLS?</h2>
<p>No. Bleichenbacher-style vulnerabilities have been found in <a href="https://www.nds.rub.de/research/publications/breaking-xml-encryption-pkcs15/">XML Encryption</a>, <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/417">PKCS#11 interfaces</a>, <a href="https://www.nds.rub.de/research/publications/-security-javascript-object-signing-and-encryption/">Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)</a>, or <a href="https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20120312.txt">Cryptographic Message Syntax / S/MIME</a>.</p>
<p>Every protocol that uses RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption is at risk of exposing similar vulnerabilities.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>How is ROBOT different from Bleichenbacher's original attack?</h2>
<p>Bleichenbacher's original work from 1998 used an oracle based on different TLS alerts. We changed it to allow various different signals to distinguish between error types like timeouts, connection resets, duplicate TLS alerts.</p>
<p>We also discovered that by using a shortened message flow where we send the <b><code>ClientKeyExchange</code></b> message without a <b><code>ChangeCipherSpec</code></b> and <b><code>Finished</code></b> message allows us to find more vulnerable hosts.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>So... ROBOT doesn't add a whole lot, right?</h2>
<p>That's correct. The surprising fact is that our research was very straightforward. We used minor variations of the original attack and were successful. This issue was hiding in plain sight.</p>
<p>This means neither the vendors of the affected products nor security researchers have investigated this before, although it's a very classic and well-known attack.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>How is this related to previous research?</h2>
<p>Originally this type of attack was <a href="http://archiv.infsec.ethz.ch/education/fs08/secsem/bleichenbacher98.pdf">discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher in 1998</a>.</p>
<p>Klima, Pokorny and Rosa <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052">improved the attack and discovered the bad-version oracle in 2003</a>.</p>
<p>In 2012 Romain Bardou and others <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/417">developed a much more efficient Bleichenbacher attack algorithm</a> that reduces the number of needed connections.</p>
<p>In 2014 <a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/meyer">Christopher Meyer and others discovered Bleichenbacher vulnerabilities in JSSE and other products</a> and describe the first practical timing attacks.</p>
<p>Tibor Jager and colleagues discovered that <a href="https://www.nds.rub.de/media/nds/veroeffentlichungen/2015/08/21/Tls13QuicAttacks.pdf">it is possible to use a cross-protocol Bleichenbacher attack against TLS 1.3 and QUIC</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://drownattack.com/">DROWN attack</a> is a protocol level Bleichenbacher vulnerability in SSL version 2. The DROWN research also contains further insights on cross-protocol scenarios.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Are there any tools that I can use to scan for this vulnerability?</h2>
<p>We have reached out to the developers of various TLS testing tools before the publication of our research. The following tools have checks that will cover ROBOT:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://testssl.sh/">testssl.sh</a> has a test closely modelled after our own one. A <a href="https://testssl.sh/bleichenbacher/">snapshot is available</a>, it's not yet part of a release. It also supports SNI and STARTTLS, which our test does not.</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Attacker">TLS-Attacker</a> already contained Bleichenbacher checks before our research, <a href="https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2017/12/tls-attacker-v22-and-robot-attack.html">version 2.2 was extended with additional checks to cover all ROBOT variations</a>.</li>
<li><a href="https://www.ssllabs.com/">SSLLabs</a> has added a check for ROBOT.</li>
<li><a href="https://www.tripwire.com/products/tripwire-ip360/">Tripwire IP360</a> added detection for vulnerable F5 devices in ASPL-753 which was released in coordination with F5's public advisory. Generic detection of Bleichenbacher oracles will be released in coordination with this publication.</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer">tlsfuzzer</a> has an extensive test script for Bleichenbacher vulns, though it will also complain about misbehaving servers that are not necessarily vulnerable.</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/nabla-c0d3/sslyze">SSLyze</a> added <a href="https://nabla-c0d3.github.io/blog/2017/12/17/sslyze-robot-scan/">support for ROBOT detection</a> after our disclosure.</li>
</ul>
<p>We encourage developers of other security and TLS testing tools to add checks for ROBOT. You can use <a href="https://github.com/robotattackorg/robot-detect">our code</a>, it's under a CC0 (public domain) license.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Can this attack be used against Bitcoin?</h2>
<p>Bitcoin does not use RSA, instead it uses elliptic curve cryptography based on the curve secp256k1. Our attack cannot be directly applied to that. However if you transform a quantum key exchange to a supersingular Isogeny you can attack post-quantum RSA and thus apply our attack indirectly to secp256k1.</p>
<p>We believe the only way Bitcoin can defend against this is to immediately switch to Quantum Blockchains.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Will you publish the proof of concept?</h2>
<p>We have published a proof of concept as part of our <a href="https://github.com/robotattackorg/robot-detect">robot-detect</a> script.</p>
<p>We delayed publishing the poc after our initial announcement to give people time to patch and fix their servers and to play the CTF.</p>
<h3>Play our Capture The Flag contests!</h3>
<p><b>Update:</b> The CTF is over!</p>
<p>We have a <a href="https://ctf.robotattack.org">ROBOT CTF</a> contest where you can test your crypotgraphic attack skills.</p>
<p>This will require the implementation of a practical Bleichenbacher attack. While we can't make any rules about what you publish we ask you to delay the publication of any tools you create during the contest until it is over.</p>
<p>We will probably run the contest for two months, but we may revisit the timeline.</p>
</section>
<section>
<h2>Is this vuln really serious enough to deserve a name, a logo and a web page?</h2>
<p>We had considerable disagreement in our team about this. Juraj agreed only under protest. All complaints about this issue need to go to Hanno.</p>
<h2><a id="media"></a>Media, Blogs and more</h2>
<h4>Media reports</h4>
<p><a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/11/20/f5_crypto_weakness/">The Register: F5 DROWNing, not waving, in crypto fail</a><br />
<a href="https://www.golem.de/news/robot-angriff-19-jahre-alter-angriff-auf-tls-funktioniert-immer-noch-1712-131607.html">Golem.de: ROBOT-Angriff - 19 Jahre alter Angriff auf TLS funktioniert immer noch</a><br />
<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/12/12/robot-hack-exploits-encryption-weaknesses-in-major-websites-facebook-patches/">Forbes: 'ROBOT Attack' Exposed Facebook With 19-Year-Old Bug -- Massive Websites Still Vulnerable</a><br />
<a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/a-worrying-number-of-sites-remain-open-to-major-crypto-flaw-from-1998/">Ars Technica: 1998 attack that messes with sites’ secret crypto keys is back in a big way</a><br />
<a href="https://thehackernews.com/2017/12/bleichenbacher-robot-rsa.html">The Hacker News: ROBOT Attack: 19-Year-Old Bleichenbacher Attack On Encrypted Web Reintroduced</a><br />
<a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/12/13/robot_tls_rsa_flaw/">The Register: I, Robot? Aiiiee, ROBOT! RSA TLS crypto attack pwns Facebook, PayPal, 27 of 100 top domains</a><br />
<a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/66682/hacking/robot-attack.html">Security Affairs: ROBOT Attack: RSA TLS crypto attack worked against Facebook, PayPal, and tens of 100 top domains</a><br />
<a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/variation-of-19-year-old-cryptographic-attack-affects-facebook-paypal-others/">Bleeping Computer: Variation of 19-Year-Old Cryptographic Attack Affects Facebook, PayPal, Others</a><br />
<a href="https://threatpost.com/19-year-old-tls-vulnerability-weakens-modern-website-crypto/129158/">ThreatPost: 19-Year-Old TLS Vulnerability Weakens Modern Website Crypto</a><br />
<a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/tls-exploit-robot-capitalizes-on-19-year-old-vulnerability-vendors-issue-patch/article/718417/">SC Magazine: TLS exploit 'ROBOT' capitalizes on 19-year-old vulnerability; vendors issue patch</a><br />
<a href="https://www.heise.de/security/meldung/ROBOT-Attacke-TLS-Angriff-von-1998-funktioniert-immer-noch-3916994.html">heise: ROBOT-Attacke: TLS-Angriff von 1998 funktioniert immer noch</a><br />
<a href="https://www.digi.no/artikler/gammel-kryptosarbarhet-er-tilbake-facebook-blant-de-berorte/414352">digi.no: Gammel kryptosårbarhet er tilbake. Facebook blant de berørte</a></p>
<h4>Blog posts</h4>
<p><a href="https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/vert/return-bleichenbachers-oracle-threat-robot/?utm_content=bufferb1d9b&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer">TripWire / The State of Security: VERT Threat Alert: Return of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Threat (ROBOT)</a><br />
<a href="https://cryptosense.com/bleichenbacher-is-back-again/">Cryptosense: Bleichenbacher is Back – Again</a><br />
<a href="https://www.trustzone.com/robot-attack-rsa-encryption-vulnerable-choose-ecc-tlsssl-certificates-ensure-security">Trustzone: The ROBOT attack: RSA Encryptoin is vulnerable</a><br />
<a href="https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2017/12/14/algorithms-cant-be-patched/">Kudelski Security / JP Aumasson: Algorithms can't be patched</a><br />
<a href="https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2017/12/tls-attacker-v22-and-robot-attack.html">Juraj Somorovsky: TLS-Attacker v2.2 and the ROBOT attack</a><br />
<a href="https://access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/3275721">Hubert Kario / Red Hat: Detecting ROBOT and other vulnerabilities using Red Hat testing tools</a></p>
<h4>Other</h4>
<p><a href="https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/144389">CERT/CC: Vulnerability Note VU#144389</a><br />
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25135.html">TLS mailing list, Colm MacCárthaigh (Amazon s2n): A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS</a></p>
</section>
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